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Paranormal beliefs (PBs), such as the belief in the soul, or in extrasensory perception,
are common in the general population. While there is information regarding what
these beliefs correlate with (e.g., cognitive biases, personality styles), there is little
information regarding the causal direction between these beliefs and their correlates.
To investigate the formation of beliefs, we use an experimental design, in which PBs
and belief-associated cognitive biases are assessed before and after a central event:
a magic performance (see also Mohr et al., 2018). In the current paper, we report
a series of studies investigating the “paranormal potential” of magic performances
(Study 1, N = 49; Study 2, N = 89; Study 3, N = 123). We investigated (i) which
magic performances resulted in paranormal explanations, and (ii) whether PBs and a
belief-associated cognitive bias (i.e., repetition avoidance) became enhanced after the
performance. Repetition avoidance was assessed using a random number generation
task. After the performance, participants rated to what extent the magic performance
could be explained in psychic (paranormal), conjuring, or religious terms. We found
that conjuring explanations were negatively associated with religious and psychic
explanations, whereas religious and psychic explanations were positively associated.
Enhanced repetition avoidance correlated with higher PBs ahead of the performance.
We also observed a significant increase in psychic explanations and a drop in
conjuring explanations when performances involved powerful psychic routines (e.g.,
the performer contacted the dead). While the experimentally induced enhancement of
psychic explanations is promising, future studies should account for potential variables
that might explain absent framing and before–after effects (e.g., emotion, attention).
Such effects are essential to understand the formation and manipulation of belief.
Keywords: belief, causality, cognitive bias, event probability, magic
INTRODUCTION
Paranormal beliefs (PBs) and associated phenomena are of substantial interest to both the general
population and the scientific community. Survey data indicate that PBs,1 such as beliefs in telepathy,
witchcraft, and precognition, are common in the general population (Rice, 2003; Moore, 2005;
Knittel and Schetsche, 2012). In the laboratory, adults often explicitly deny PBs, but implicitly
1We work on the basis that the terms paranormal, supernatural, and magical beliefs can be used interchangeably (Lindeman
and Svedholm, 2012).
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acknowledge paranormal interpretations of an event (Nemeroff
and Rozin, 2000; Subbotsky and Quinteros, 2002; Subbotsky,
2004a,b). Psychologists have long been interested in paranormal
and/or magical (including psi) phenomena in children as well
as adults (Rosengren et al., 2000; Subbotsky, 2001, 2004a,
2010; Wiseman et al., 2003; Wiseman and Watt, 2004, 2006;
Lindeman and Aarnio, 2006; Losh and Nzekwe, 2011; Risen,
2016). Some studies focused on the existence of paranormal
phenomena (Honorton and Harper, 1974; Bem and Honorton,
1994; Milton and Wiseman, 1999; Etzold, 2006; Moulton and
Kosslyn, 2008), while others focused on cognitive thought
processes that underpin PBs (Brugger et al., 1990; Lindeman et al.,
2008; Fiske and Taylor, 2013). Yet, others focused on personality
traits (e.g., intelligence, creativity, schizotypy traits, extraversion,
and reasoning abilities) associated with PBs (for reviews, see e.g.,
French, 1992; Irwin, 1993).
There are a variety of definitions of what constitute PBs.
Woolley (1997) defined PBs as reasonings that are “based on
some sort of misconception about causality, or about natural laws
more generally” (Woolley, 1997, p. 993), while Keinan (1994)
regarded PBs as “any explanation of a behavior or experience
that contradicts the laws of nature... [and] usually refers to
powers, principles, or entities that lack empirical evidence or
scientific foundation” (Keinan, 1994, p. 48). Yet, others define
PBs as ontological beliefs (Alcock, 1995; Subbotsky, 2004a), for
example, as “the interpreting of two closely occurring events as
though one caused the other, without any concern for the causal
link” (Alcock, 1995, p. 15). Such definitions imply that cognitive
processes, strategies, or biases underlie PBs (e.g., reasoning).
By inference, individuals who demonstrate PBs should be more
likely to use any of these cognitive processes mentioned in these
definitions. Indeed, research indicates that PBs are associated
with biases such as clustering illusions (Gilovich et al., 1985),
availability error (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973), confirmation
bias (Wason, 1960), illusion of control (Langer, 1975; Irwin et al.,
2013), and the blind spot bias (Pronin et al., 2002). Individuals
high in PBs seem to consider only part of available information,
overestimate the occurrence of improbable events, and tend
to over-attribute causal links between events that occurred
close in time and space (Pratkanis, 1992; Taylor et al., 1995;
Willingham, 2008; Fiske and Taylor, 2013). Further research
indicates that individuals high in PBs show relatively deficient
deductive (Lawrence and Peters, 2004), logical (Tsakanikos,
2004), and conditional (Sellen et al., 2005) reasoning abilities.
Finally, participants with elevated compared to low PBs tend to
see meaning in random events and stimuli (Brugger et al., 1993;
Blackmore and Moore, 1994; Riekki et al., 2013).
While the above studies are important and informative, they
are nevertheless correlational. It is, therefore, not possible to
establish the causal direction between the cognitive biases and
the PBs (see also Mohr et al., 2018). In the published literature,
researchers assume that PBs are present in early childhood
(Subbotsky, 2004a,b) and have a trait-like characteristic (e.g.,
Wiseman et al., 2003; Lindeman and Aarnio, 2006). This
assumption implies that PBs in adulthood reflect potential
residues from childhood. However, some laboratory studies
have shown that people’s willingness to endorse paranormal
phenomena is malleable. For example, verbal suggestions
facilitated people’s experience of seeing a spoon bending
(Wiseman et al., 2003), individuals’ perception of a psychic’s2
abilities (Wiseman and Greening, 2005), and enhanced their
impression of being observed in a supposedly “haunted” room
(Bering et al., 2005). Even scientists have been tricked into
accepting a magician’s psychic abilities (see, e.g., Benassi et al.,
1980; Randi, 1983a,b).
Benassi et al. (1980) showed that highly educated adults
(including scientists) could be fooled into attributing psychic
powers to ordinary magic performances. In their study, a
magician performed a range of magic tricks in the classroom.
Crucially, the magician was introduced as either a conjuror
(conjuror condition)3 or a psychic (psychic condition). After
the performance, individuals in the psychic as compared to the
conjuror condition provided higher psychic explanations. Yet,
more than half of the participants in either condition considered
psychic explanations, i.e., also in the conjuror condition. This
experimental manipulation implies that contextual framing
(psychic vs. conjuror condition) seems to influence how people
interpret a magic performance; however, the authors did not
assess PBs and PB-related cognitive biases before and after the
performance. Thus, causal inferences cannot be drawn from this
report. Nevertheless, the paradigm of Benassi et al. (1980) offers
interesting avenues to develop studies targeting PB formation (see
also Mohr et al., 2018).
Mohr et al. (2015) investigated whether exposure to a magic
performance in the classroom was able to change an individual’s
PBs. As in Benassi et al. (1980), about half of the sample was
told that the performer was a psychic, and the remainder that
the performer was a conjuror. Explicit and implicit measures
of PBs were measured both before and after the performance,
using the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS, Tobacyk, 2004)
and repetition avoidance, respectively.4 After the performance,
participants responded as to whether they would explain the
event in psychic, conjuring, or religious terms. The group
that received the psychic framing (the performer is a psychic;
psychic group) demonstrated stronger repetition avoidance
compared to the group that received the conjuror framing (the
performer is a conjuror; conjuror group). However, the authors
reported no differences between sessions (i.e., before–after magic
performance) in either participants’ explicit (RPBs scores) or
implicit (repetition avoidance) correlates of PBs. Participants’
baseline belief scores correlated, however, with higher psychic
explanation ratings, and they gave explanations in intuitive
ways: the psychic group gave more psychic explanations and the
conjuror group gave more conjuring explanations. Yet, overall,
2When we refer to the terms magician, conjuror, or even psychic, we refer to the
Robert Houdin magician acting style (see, for example, Lamont and Wiseman,
1999; Ortiz, 2006). In other words, we refer to someone who is playing as if he/she
was a psychic (who, in fact, is not). This is radically different from someone who
genuinely identifies him/herself as having paranormal (psychic) abilities.
3For purposes of consistency in the current report, we re-label Benassi et al. (1980)
“magic condition” “conjuror condition” or “conjuror group.”
4Repetition avoidance was assessed [using a Mental Dice Task (MDT)], because
it has been found to be higher in individuals with higher-PBs compared to
individuals skeptical of PBs (Brugger et al., 1990). Thus, repetition avoidance
represents a PB-related cognitive bias.
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the psychic explanation ratings were relatively low, indicating
few participants endorsed the demonstration as being genuinely
paranormal. We, therefore, aimed to explore ways in which the
demonstration could be made more believable, and, thus, elicit
stronger PBs.
The current series of studies builds on these observations
(Benassi et al., 1980; Mohr et al., 2015), further elaborating on
the paranormal potential of magic performances (see also Mohr
et al., 2018). Magicians use a wide range of deceptive methods
(Kuhn et al., 2014) to create impossible events (Kuhn, 2019). For
example, sleight of hand and gimmicked devices can be used to
create the illusion that it is possible to read a person’s mind, or
even to communicate with the dead. This knowledge was used
to enhance the “paranormal” nature of the magic performance.
Furthermore, the actual formulations of the framing texts used
for the psychic and conjuring conditions were aligned (i.e.,
same length, sentence structure, and message) so that only
key statements/words differed. In the second study, we further
enhanced the “paranormal” nature of the magic performance. In
the third study, we implemented the procedure of the second
study, and added a manipulation check to ascertain that the
framing instructions had been read and understood. Participants
were always tested in one session in the classroom, through
booklets on which the framing was given in a written format,
and the key measures, namely, PBs and repetition avoidance,
were assessed before and after the performance. In addition,
after the performance, we asked participants to rate the extent
to which the event could be explained in psychic, conjuring,
or religious terms. In line with our reasoning (see also Mohr
et al., 2018), we expected that the psychic group would consider
more psychic explanations than the conjuror group, and would
yield stronger increases in PBs and repetition avoidance than
the conjuror group. We also expected psychic explanations to
be higher in the second and third studies compared to the first
study.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Undergraduate psychology students were the attendant
participants for Study 1 (N = 53), Study 2 (N = 95), and
Study 3 (N = 170). Subsequent to data cleaning (see Section
“Data Analysis” for details), we retained 49 students for Study 1
(67.3% females, Mage = 22.37 years, SD = 5.69); 89 students for
Study 2 (82% females, Mage = 20.49 years, SD = 5.31); and 123
students for Study 3 (78% females, Mage = 20.54 years, SD = 5.40).
Analyses were performed on the data from the remaining 261
participants (77.39% females, Mage = 20.87 years, SD = 5.45).
All studies took place after a lecture in a psychology
undergraduate course on research methods, given by the second
author (GK) at Goldsmiths University in London. Students
participated in exchange for course credits. The study protocol
was approved by the Goldsmiths Ethics Committee and followed
the ethical guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki (World
Medical Association, 2013). Each participant provided written
informed consent prior to the experiment.
Measures Common to All Studies
Paranormal Belief
We used the RPBS (Tobacyk, 2004) to measure PBs. This 26-
item self-report questionnaire consists of seven subscales
measuring Traditional Religious Belief, Psi, Witchcraft,
Superstition, Spiritualism, Extraordinary Life Forms, and
Precognition. The four traditional religious belief items can
be summed into a traditional belief score and the remaining
items into a non-traditional belief score (see also Mohr et al.,
2015). Item examples include “Some psychics can accurately
predict the future” (non-traditional beliefs), “It is possible to
communicate with the dead” (non-traditional beliefs), and
“There is a heaven and hell” (traditional belief). Items are
formulated such that participants are asked to answer along
a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree). Accounting for reverse coded items,
the scores are summed so that higher scores reflect greater
beliefs. We had no a priori prediction that the different non-
traditional beliefs subscales would be differentially sensitive
to our manipulation; thus, we did not account for these. We
account, however, for the possibility that traditional belief
(or practices) are more sensitive to cultural influences than
non-traditional beliefs (MacDonald, 1995; Orenstein, 2002).
Accordingly, we used, respectively, the sum scores for the
traditional belief items (N = 4) and the non-traditional beliefs
items (N = 22). Normative values can be found in Tobacyk
(2004), and a recent psychometric evaluation in Drinkwater et al.
(2017).
Explanation
In line with Mohr et al. (2015), participants rated on a
seven-point Likert scale (1 for strongly disagree to 7 for
strongly agree) whether the performance was accomplished
through (1) paranormal, psychic, or supernatural powers
(psychic explanation), (2) ordinary magic trickery (conjuring
explanation), or (3) religious miracles (religious explanation).
Detailed instructions are presented in Supplementary Material.
Mental Dice Task
In the Mental Dice Task (MDT; Brugger et al., 1990), participants
received written and verbal instructions to imagine throwing a
dice each time they heard a beep and to write down the number
that they imagined being on top of the dice (66 trials). Computer-
generated beeps were played 66 times at 1 s intervals, during
which the participant wrote down the imagined number. We
calculated the repetitions in the number sequence (i.e., 1-1, 2-
2, and 3-3). If the number generation were entirely random, we
would expect participants to produce on average 11 repetitions.
Previous research has shown that participants avoid repetitions,
and that this repetition avoidance is stronger for individuals
scoring high on non-traditional beliefs (Brugger et al., 1990).
Magic Performances
Study 1
The magic performance was performed by a professional
magician (henceforth, “performer”), who was a member of
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the Magic Circle.5 The performer presented a range of magic
tricks that were presented using an occult gothic theme. This
performance included conventional magic tricks using magic
props (e.g., cards, gimmicked locks). The tricks were similar to
those used by Benassi et al. (1980). Unlike Mohr et al. (2015)’s
single magic trick, the performer did several different magic tricks
and the entire performance lasted for approximately 20 min. The
performance started with a card trick, in which the performer
demonstrated his telepathic abilities by allegedly reading the
spectator’s mind to discover a chosen card. This was repeated for
three randomly selected individuals. In another trick, a member
of the audience was asked to choose one of several keys, which
turned out to be the only key to open a box. The performer also
demonstrated his telekinetic powers by giving the illusion that
he was capable of moving a key simply though the power of his
mind.
Study 2
We kept the same overall procedure from Study 1, but aimed
for a stronger performance. After Study 1, students reported
that they were not very impressed by the performance, and did
not consider the event to be of psychic nature. In Study 2,
similar to Study 1, the magic performance was done by a
professional magician, who was a member of the Magic Circle.
This time, a different person did the magic performance due
to special circumstances (see Section “Acknowledgments”). We
intentionally avoided using special magic props, and ensured
that the demonstration would emulate a psychic reading typically
encountered in public spiritualist reading. We predicted that
such a demonstration would make the psychic nature appear
more genuine. Here, the performance was divided into two parts.
In the first part, the performer guessed the color on a dice6 a
volunteer has selected (the dice is turned such that the selected
color is shown on top). The performer indicated that he would
do so by “catching the aura” of the volunteer. The performer
tried it with five volunteers. He was false (deliberately, in order
to make it “more real”) two out of five times – a technique
commonly used by magicians to enhance the effectiveness of the
illusion. In the second part, the performer invited a confederate
from the audience to join him. From the audience’s perspective,
the confederate was a randomly selected volunteer, who had
been selected through a ballot. However, this ballot was rigged,
which ensured we selected our confederate as the volunteer. The
audience was not aware that this person was a confederate. This
female confederate was asked to think about one of her deceased
close family members, in order to get in touch with him/her.
The performer, after “having felt” a presence, started to “guess”
details about the person. He first suggested that the presence was
her father, deceased 10 years ago. He reported more and more
correct details about his life. These details were almost spot on
(i.e., he guessed that his name was Zack, but it was actually Jack).
The confederate became (i.e., acted) increasingly emotional. The
performer finished his magic performance by telling the young
5The Magic Circle promotes and advances the art of magic. It was founded in the
United Kingdom in 1905. Its headquarter is in London. Membership is by merit.
See also http://www.themagiccircle.co.uk.
6The dice showed colors instead of numbers or dots on its sides.
woman that her father loves her, that he was very proud of her,
and that he will always look after her.
Study 3
For Study 3, the same performer, as in Study 2, did the magic
performance. The same magic performance was used, except for
some changed details about the revelations (i.e., the deceased
relative was the grandmother). The results from Study 2 revealed
that the performance was very convincing, and we, therefore,
implemented the same overall procedure.
General Procedure
The sequence of events is depicted in Figure 1. After attending
a psychology lecture, students were invited to take part in the
experiment and were instructed to sit separately from each
other by at least one empty seat. They were also asked not to
communicate with each other in order to reduce the possibility
of influencing one another. At this point, participants were all
informed that they would experience a psychic performance
(second event in Figure 1). The experimenter gave them the
following verbal information:
“As you will be aware, the Anomalistic Psychology Unit at
Goldsmiths has a keen interest in investigating psychic abilities.
Over the years, we have carried out numerous experiments to test
whether the claims made by psychics hold up on closer scrutiny.
While most of the individuals tested so far generally fail these
tests, we were very fortunate in that we did find one person who
passed most of the preliminarily tests (8/10). His name is Jon and
while not perfect, his performance was significantly better than
chance (p < 0.0032). Jon has told us that he has been developing
a presentation of his psychic abilities, and has asked us if he could
present it to you and get your opinions and reactions. I thought
that this would be very interesting, and so I agreed to let him
do it.”
This introduction to the experiment, in particular the last
sentence, was adapted from Benassi et al. (1980). Subsequent to
these general instructions, participants received work booklets
that contained all of the questionnaires and some additional
information. Participants were randomly assigned to the magic
or psychic condition (third event in Figure 1).
For the magic condition, the students received written
information that the performance was carried out by a magician
pretending to do a psychic performance. They read the following
statement: “Jon is a professional magician who performs psychic
performances for entertainment and has helped investigate
fraudulent psychic phenomena. He is an active member of
the Magic Circle, and has gained international respect for his
conjuring ability. Jon has convinced many members of the APRU
(Anomalistic Psychology Research Unit) with his conjuring skills.
What you are about to see is a performance showing his conjuring
deception skills and to the best of our knowledge does not involve
any real psychic skills.”
For the psychic condition, the students received written
information that the performance was carried out by a true
psychic. They read the following statement: “Jon is a professional
psychic who performs psychic performances for clients and has
helped investigate psychic phenomena. He is an active member of
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in Studies 1, 2, and 3. Note, the gray step
(manipulation check) was only performed in Studies 2 and 3. Also, the results
on the open question are not presented, because the formulation of the
question (“Could you please describe what you saw in your own words?”)
resulted in simple descriptions of the event as such. MDT, Mental Dice Task;
RPBs, Revised Paranormal Belief Scale.
the European Psychic Association, and has gained international
respect for his psychic ability. Jon has convinced many members
of the APRU with his psychic skills. What you are about to see is
a performance showing his psychic skills and to the best of our
knowledge does not involve any conjuring deception.”
After this written information, participants filled out the
RPBs (Tobacyk, 2004; fifth event in Figure 1). Subsequently,
they were asked to perform the MDT (Brugger et al., 1990;
fifth event in Figure 1). Once completed, the performer
introduced himself to the audience (sixth event in Figure 1).
After the performance, the students were asked the three
questions on how they would explain the event (eighth event
in Figure 1). Afterward, participants completed a second
time the RPBs (Tobacyk, 2004; ninth event in Figure 1),
before doing the MDT again (Brugger et al., 1990; 10th event
in Figure 1). Finally, they were asked the following open
question: “Could you please describe what you saw in your
own words?” (11th event in Figure 1), before being fully
debriefed about the purpose of the experiment (12th event in
Figure 1). Here, the performer explained the method behind the
effect.
To summarize, the procedures were largely comparable across
the three studies (see also Mohr et al., 2015), apart from two
points. The first point was that we added a manipulation check
(box in gray in Figure 1) for both Studies 2 and 3. This check
consisted of asking participants two brief open questions after
the framing text in order to ensure they had read and understood
the information: (1) “Please summarize the instructions you have
read in the space below” and (2) “Please write down what Jon’s
profession is.” The second point was the change in the magic
performance itself (divided into two stages; dice color guessing
by “catching aura” of participant, and psychic reading, see under
“Magic performance”).
Data Analysis
Of the original 53 participants in Study 1, four participants
were excluded. For one participant, demographic data (i.e.,
gender and age) were missing, and the other three were
excluded because of their performance on the MDT – two
did not complete the task (on neither occasion) and one
entered the same number for each mental throw of the dice.
Of the original 95 participants in Study 2, six participants
were excluded because of incomplete MDT data: four did not
complete the MDT (on neither occasion) and two participants
did not complete the task on one of the occasions. Of the
original 170 participants in Study 3, 47 participants were
excluded. Forty-five were excluded because of incomplete MDT
data: eight participants did not complete the sequence at
least once; 37 participants missed at least two mental throws
(range of missed throws = 2–59); and two participants were
outliers, showing an over-proportional number of repetitions.
In addition, one participant was excluded for having already
completed the experiment before, and another participant for
reporting “non-binary” gender. Since gender has an effect on
our outcome measure (see also Aarnio and Lindeman, 2005;
French and Wilson, 2007), the data for this participant were
excluded.
Subsequent to this initial data cleaning, we examined the data
for normality and outliers. The values for skewness and kurtosis
were within the accepted range of ±2 for parametric analyses
(Gravetter and Wallnau, 2014). No additional outliers were
identified. Next, we performed Pearson correlations between age
and our study variables (see Table 2), and t-tests to ascertain
potential gender differences. To test our study hypotheses, we
performed a series of repeated measures ANCOVAs with framing
(psychic, magic) and study (Study 1–3) as between-subject
measures, and testing session (before, after) as within-subjects’
variable on (i) PB scores (non-traditional belief, traditional
belief); (ii) the number of repetitions in the MDT; and (iii)
explanation scores (magic, psychic, religious). As will be seen
in Section “Results”, we observed age and gender effects. Thus,
we conducted all models with age and gender as covariates.
We report Mauchly’s test in case the assumption of sphericity
was violated. Post hoc comparisons were performed using
false discovery rate (FDR, see Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995);
corrected p-values are indicated as follow: pcorr.
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RESULTS
Age and Gender Effects
The following section explores possible sex differences and age
effects in the variables. There was no significant age difference
[t(259) =−1.935, p = 0.054] between women (Mage = 20.52 years,
SD = 5.04) and men (Mage = 22.07 years, SD = 6.57). Males
as compared to females (i) generated more MDT repetitions
before the performance, (ii) reported less traditional belief both
before and after the performance, (iii) gave more conjuring
explanations, and (iv) less psychic explanations (see Table 1).
No gender differences were discerned for religious explanations,
MDT repetitions after the performance, and non-traditional
belief scores both before and after the performance.
With regard to age effects, Pearson correlations (Table 2)
showed that older participants reported higher conjuring
explanation scores and lower psychic explanation scores.
Moreover, with increasing age, we found lower traditional belief
scores, both before and after the performance.
Relationships Between Dependent
Measures
Self-report questionnaire scores as well as repetition avoidance
scores correlated highly (all r values >0.70) when comparing
the before and after measurements (Table 2). Also, higher non-
traditional belief scores before the performance correlated with
stronger repetition avoidance after the performance (Table 2).
All correlations between the traditional belief and non-traditional
belief scores were positive and significant (Table 2). Moreover,
while the explanation scores were unrelated to performance in
the MDT task, we note that higher traditional belief and non-
traditional belief scores, both before and after the performance,
were associated with higher psychic and religious explanation
scores. Conjuring explanation scores, on the other hand,
were unrelated to traditional belief scores (both before and
after). With higher conjuring explanations, participants reported
lower non-traditional belief scores both before and after the
performance (Table 2). These latter results are also reflected
in the inter-correlations between explanation scores, such that
higher psychic explanation scores were associated with higher
religious and lower conjuring explanation scores. Also, higher
religious explanation scores were associated with lower conjuring
explanation scores (Table 2).
Effect of Study and Framing Group on
Repetition Avoidance Before and After
the Performance
The 2(framing) × 3(study) × 2(session) ANCOVA on the
number of repetitions revealed a main effect of gender [F(1,
253) = 4.076, p = 0.045, η2p = 0.016], with men showing less
repetition avoidance than women (see Table 1), and a main effect
of study (F(2, 253) = 3.065, p = 0.048, η2p = 0.024). Pairwise
comparisons showed more repetition avoidance in Study 3
(M = 4.86) than in both Study 1 (M = 6.35) [MD(se) = 1.488
(0.718), p = 0.039] and Study 2 (M = 6.02) [MD(se) = 1.157
(0.586), p = 0.049]. The difference between Study 1 and 2
was non-significant [MD(se) = 0.331 (0.758), p = 0.663]. The
significant pairwise comparisons were, however, not significant
after FDR correction (Study 3 vs. Study 1: pcorr = 0.074; Study 3
vs. Study 2; pcorr = 0.074). The model revealed no other significant
main effects or interactions (all F-values <1.50).
Effect of Study and Framing Group on
Traditional Belief Scores Before and
After the Performance
The 2(framing)× 3(study)× 2(session) ANCOVA on traditional
belief scores showed a main effect for gender [F(1, 253) = 15.30,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.057; women > men, see also Table 1], and a
main effect of study [F(2, 253) = 3.217, p = 0.042, η2p = 0.025].
Pairwise comparisons showed comparable traditional belief
scores in Study 3 and Study 1 [MD(SE) = −0.769 (0.334),
pcorr = 0.066], Study 3 and Study 2 [MD(SE) = −0.487 (0.273),
pcorr = 0.114] as well as Study 1 and Study 2 [MD(SE) = −0.282
(0.353), pcorr = 0.425]. There were no other significant main
effects or interactions (all F-values <3.30).
Effect of Study and Framing Group on
Non-traditional Beliefs Before and After
the Performance
Since Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of Sphericity
was violated [χ2(df = 2) = 75.58, p < 0.001], we report the
Greenhouse–Geisser corrected estimates of Sphericity (ε = 0.79).
The 2(framing) × 3(study) × 2(session) ANCOVA on non-
traditional beliefs revealed no significant main effects or
interactions (all F-values < 2.60). Contrary to our a priori
prediction, anticipating stronger performance in Study 2 and 3
as compared to Study 1, we found no main effect of study [F(2,
253) = 2.503, p = 0.084, η2p = 0.019]. Pairwise comparisons showed
that non-traditional belief scores were similar in Study 3 and
Study 1 [MD(SE) =−0.379 (0.171), pcorr = 0.081], in Study 2 and
Study 1 [MD(SE) = −0.310 (0.180), pcorr = 0.131], as well as in
Study 2 and Study 3 [MD(SE) =−0.070 (0.139), pcorr = 0.617].
Effect of Study and Framing Group on
Explanation
The 2(framing) × 3(study) × 3(explanation) ANCOVA revealed
a main effect for explanation [F(2, 402) = 8.706, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.033] and study (F(2, 253) = 4.479, p = 0.012, η2p = 0.034).
These main effects interacted; explanation interacted with study
[F(4, 402) = 8.446, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.063], gender [F(2,
402) = 4.52, p = 0.018, η2p = 0.018], and age [F(2, 402) = 4.53,
p = 0.018, η2p = 0.018]. There were no other significant main
effects or interactions (all F-values < 2.98).
We first unpacked the interaction between study and
explanation (see Figure 2), with follow-up univariate ANCOVAs,
controlling again for age and gender. The analysis of psychic
explanation scores showed a significant main effect of age (F(1,
256) = 6.233, p = 0.013, η2p = 0.024; see also Table 2), gender (F(1,
256) = 7.755, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.029; see also Table 1), and study
(F(2, 256) = 7.599, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.056). For the main effect of
study, pairwise comparisons showed lower psychic explanation
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TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations of the dependent measures for the total sample and the gender groups, separately.
All Women Men t-test Effect
(N = 261) (N = 202) (N = 59) size
Measure M SD M SD M SD Value Cohen’s d
MDT repetitions Before 5.42 4.28 5.05 4.15 6.66 4.54 −2.56∗ −0.37
After 5.63 4.89 5.37 4.68 6.53 5.49 −1.60 −0.23
TB Before 3.95 2.02 4.22 2.05 3.04 1.59 4.66∗∗∗ 0.64
After 3.88 2.10 4.18 2.12 2.87 1.65 4.99∗∗∗ 0.69
NTB Before 2.69 1.01 2.73 0.98 2.56 1.11 1.15 0.16
After 2.70 1.04 2.75 1.00 2.51 1.17 1.42 0.22
Explanations Psychic 3.82 1.90 4.03 1.85 3.09 1.89 3.43∗∗∗ 0.50
Conjuring 4.06 1.76 3.95 1.69 4.46 1.96 −1.82∗ −0.28
Religious 1.95 1.41 2.02 1.46 1.70 1.21 1.56 0.24
MDT, Mental Dice Task; TB, traditional belief; NTB, non-traditional beliefs; before, before performance; after, after performance. T-tests and effect sizes refer to gender
comparisons. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 2 | Pearson correlations between age, MDT repetitions, and self-report measures.
Age MDT repetitions TB NTB Explanation
Before After Before After Before After Psychic Magic Religious
MDT repetitions Before 0.071
After 0.037 0.716∗∗
TB Before −0.147∗ −0.098 −0.079
After −0.150∗ −0.078 −0.061 0.973∗∗
NTB Before −0.083 −0.109 −0.154∗ 0.464∗∗ 0.506∗∗
After −0.089 −0.096 −0.116 0.422∗∗ 0.475∗∗ 0.924∗∗
Explanation Psychic −0.198∗∗ −0.026 0.035 0.159∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.446∗∗ 0.553∗∗
Magic 0.152∗ 0.029 0.028 0.015 −0.010 −0.169∗∗ −0.236∗∗ −0.511∗∗
Religious −0.113 −0.035 −0.027 0.392∗∗ 0.400∗∗ 0.394∗∗ 0.397∗∗ 0.355∗∗ −0.221∗∗
MDT, Mental Dice Task; TB, traditional belief; NTB, non-traditional beliefs. In cases of repeated assessments, the results are shown for before and after the performance.
∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed); ∗∗p < 0.01 level (two-tailed).
scores in Study 1 compared to both Study 2 [MD(SE) = −1.084
(0.322), pcorr = 0.023)] and Study 3 [MD(SE) = −1.144 (0.306),
pcorr < 0.001]. There was no difference between Study 2 and
Study 3 [MD(SE) =−0.060 (0.249), pcorr = 0.810].
The ANCOVA of conjuring explanation scores showed a
significant main effect of study (F(2, 256) = 8.374, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.061). Pairwise comparisons showed higher conjuring
explanation scores in Study 1 compared to both Study
2 [MD(SE) = 1.247 (0.305), pcorr < 0.001] and Study 3
[MD(SE) = 0.817 (0.289), pcorr = 0.009]. There was no difference
between Study 2 and Study 3 [MD(SE) = −0.431 (0.235),
pcorr = 0.088] (see Figure 2). All other main effects and
interactions were not significant (all F-values <1.68).
Finally, the ANCOVA of religious explanation scores showed
a significant main effect of study (F(2, 256) = 6.177, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.046). Pairwise comparisons showed that religious
explanation scores were lower in Study 1 than both Study
2 [MD(SE) = −0.644 (0.248), pcorr = 0.015] and Study 3
[MD(SE) = −0.825 (0.235), pcorr = 0.023] (Figure 2). Religious
explanation scores did not differ between Study 2 and Study 3
[MD(SE) = −0.181 (0.193), pcorr = 0.393]. All other main effects
and interactions were not significant (all F-values <1.60).
DISCUSSION
Numerous studies link PBs with cognitive biases (e.g., Fiske
and Taylor, 2013; Irwin et al., 2013; Riekki et al., 2013).
Yet, these studies have been predominately correlational
in nature. Moving beyond these correlational designs, we
investigated the potential of magic performances to test for
causal relationships between PBs and PB-related cognitive
biases (see also Benassi et al., 1980; Mohr et al., 2015).
In the current study, we investigated whether people’s PBs
and repetition avoidance changed when having a magic
performance as central event (see also Mohr et al., 2018).
In three subsequent studies, psychology students saw a magic
performance in the classroom. About half of the sample was
told that the performer was a psychic and the remainder
that the performer was a conjuror. We assessed PBs and
repetition avoidance before and after the performance. After
the performance, participants rated to what extent they explain
the performance in psychic, conjuring, and religious terms.
Thus, the current design allowed us to elaborate on the
paranormal potential of the magic performance, such as whether
the performance, and/or its framing, would enhance explicit
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FIGURE 2 | Mean explanation ratings by explanation type (psychic, conjuring, and religious) and study (1–3). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean.
(RPBs scores) and implicit (repetition avoidance) correlates of
PBs.
Our results showed neither framing nor timing (before–after)
effects. This finding was consistent irrespective of (i) introducing
a manipulation check (in which the participants summarized the
framing text in their own words), (ii) providing more explicit
definitions of “psychic” and “conjuring” in the instruction and
framing texts, or (iii) increasing the strength of the paranormal
nature of the magic performance.
One of our study goals was to explore which type of magic
performance would result in an elevated amount of psychic
explanations. A previous study showed that conventional magic
tricks result in relatively low psychic explanations (Mohr et al.,
2015). In the current series of studies, we added deceptive
methods routinely used by magicians (Kuhn et al., 2014; Kuhn,
2019), including those giving the illusion of reading a person’s
mind or communicating with the dead. The performance in
Study 1 resembled the one in Mohr et al. (2015). The performer
pretended to be able to “contact the dead” using his spiritual
powers. The “contact” was made through the sudden lighting up
of a candle (for more details, see Mohr et al., 2015). Students
reported that the performance was not particularly strong in
psychic terms. For Studies 2 and 3, the performer was in contact
with a deceased person close to the confederate, and received
accurate information from this deceased person. He did so after
a general magic routine (knowing participants’ choices). In line
with our goal, we could observe enhanced psychic potential
of the magic performance, a significant increase in psychic
explanations, as well as a drop in conjuring explanations in
Studies 2 and 3 as compared to Study 1.
Despite the enhanced psychic potential of the magic
performance in Studies 2 and 3, the lack of before–after
differences on both explicit and implicit measures of PBs was
disappointing. The possible reasons are, as yet, unclear to us (but
see below some potential suggestions). The lack of framing effects
(i.e., any difference between the psychic and conjurer group) was
also unexpected, inconsistent with Benassi et al. (1980) and Mohr
et al. (2015). It is possible that participants mixed up the different
meanings of psychic and conjuring (there is evidence of this in
participants’ responses). We changed the original framing text
(Mohr et al., 2015) in the current studies to align the formulations
of the psychic and conjuring framing texts (i.e., both framing
texts had the same length, sentence structure, and message, and
only differed in key statements/words). This alignment might
have blurred the differences between the meaning of psychic
and conjuring for some participants. We present a posteriori
data that may support this explanation. Out of 261 participants,
96 rated the performance to be explained in both psychic
and conjuring terms. The psychic and conjuring explanation
scores were both above 4 on the seven-point Likert scale.
For these participants, psychic and conjuring beliefs might be
blurred or co-existent, much like it has been shown for the
co-existence of psychic and scientific beliefs (Subbotsky, 2011;
Legare et al., 2012). The latter explanation suggests the blurring
or co-existence of conjuring and psychic reasoning. Intriguingly,
Benassi et al. (1980) reported a similar finding: their participants’
explanations of the performance were inconsistent with the
framing.
It is possible that some of our undergraduate students
struggled to separate psychic from conjuring explanations,
because of the nature of the event. The experimenters could
observe that participants seemed not only highly attentive, but
some seemed to react affectively (sad, empathic, angry). Any
kind of framing information, particularly when comparably
formulated, might become redundant when followed by an
actual powerful event, such as a magic performance. This line
of reasoning is corroborated by existing evidence. For instance,
the more people endorsed PBs, the more they were likely to
interpret a psychic performance to be a genuine example of a
paranormal phenomenon (Hergovich, 2004). This relationship
was not further influenced by previously provided information.
Further studies show that initially provided information can
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become redundant (Olson et al., 2016; Thibault et al., 2018). In
these studies, the researchers used a “placebo machine,” a mock
MRI scanner. The participants were told that the scanner is not
a real MRI scanner. Yet, the researchers mimicked a real MRI
scan procedure informing participants that this procedure might
impact psychological functioning. Importantly, the researchers
noted that, a week later, many participants seemed to have
already forgotten that the machine was fake (see also Olson,
2019).
We have some final noteworthy observations. First, while
we did not replicate Mohr et al. (2015) finding that repetition
avoidance was higher in the psychic compared to the conjuror
group, we confirmed that higher non-traditional RPB scores
correlated with stronger repetition avoidance (see also Brugger
et al., 1990; Bressan, 2002). This correlation was significant only
for the non-traditional RPBs scores before the performance and
the repetition avoidance after the performance. Nevertheless,
the correlation coefficients for the remaining correlations
involving these measures were in the same direction (Table 2).
Second, although we did not find, as in Mohr et al.
(2015), that individuals undergoing psychic framing gave more
psychic explanation and conjuring framing also gave more
conjuring explanations, we did find that the RPBs scores
and explanation scores correlated in meaningful ways: we
replicated findings indicating that higher non-traditional RPBs
scores correlated with higher traditional RPBs scores (Mohr
et al., 2015; Prike et al., 2017). Also, psychic and religious
explanation scores correlated with higher traditional RPBs scores
and non-traditional RPBs scores, both before and after the
performance (Mohr et al., 2015). We also found that lower
conjuring explanation scores correlated with higher psychic and
religious explanation scores. Finally, our mean RPBs scores and
explanation scores were comparable to those in Mohr et al.
(2015).
Limitations and Challenges
Our findings need to be interpreted in light of several limitations
and challenges. First, we refer to socio-demographic variables,
such as variations in sample sizes, gender compositions, and
age. Such variations are difficult to control when performing
classroom studies. For a given study, we cannot determine
who stays, nor what the gender and age composition will be.
For instance, when looking at gender, we found that men as
compared to women (i) produced more number repetitions (see
also Spencer et al., 1999) prior to the magic performance, (ii)
had fewer traditional beliefs (see also Aarnio and Lindeman,
2007; Mahlamäki, 2012), and (iii) provided more magic and less
psychic explanations. For age, we found that older participants
yielded both higher magic explanation scores and lower psychic
explanation scores. Also, older participants within a student
sample had lower traditional belief scores (see also Prike et al.,
2017), both before and after the performance. Yet, our study
was not designed to study age or gender effects. Therefore,
we treated age and gender as covariates. Researchers can
henceforth formulate a priori assumptions on age and gender,
for laboratory studies in which age and gender ratios can be
controlled.
Second, we refer to experimental variables. For instance,
we used a seven-point Likert scale to measure PBs. Using an
uneven scale might result in “I do not know” answers right
in the middle of the scale. While we explicitly stated that
“4” refers to being “uncertain,” we cannot be sure how this
formulation was interpreted by participants. Using a Likert scale
of an even number might be preferable. One could also use
Visual Analog Scales to obtain a continuous variable (see, for
example, Reips and Funke, 2008). Another concern could be
that we used different magic performances and performers. Yet,
keeping all conditions controlled is not possible when running
live performances. Moreover, in the current series of studies, part
of our aim was investigating different performances: “exploring
magic performances that result in a significant amount of psychic
explanations,” and by inference providing promising research
material for before–after comparisons. Furthermore, the three
studies were conducted within the course of a “science of magic”
module (see also Mohr et al., 2015). Thus, participants knew
that their lecturer (GK) studies magic, which might hamper
spontaneous and honest responding. It is conceivable that
participants made themselves appear more skeptical than they
actually would be. Yet, none of our belief or explanation scores
indicated a floor effect. One can only guess how much stronger
the effects may be when taking away these contextual conditions
(e.g., performing the study at an esoteric fair where people’s mind
set is already primed to experience paranormal performances, see
Van Elk, 2017).
We surmised in the discussion above that the performance
was powerful enough to overcome framing effects. Thus, if
we want framing to be processed such that it could influence
explicit and implicit measures, we should consider when
the framing text is presented and in which format. At the
same time, there is no reason to assume that participants
were so affectively or attentively captured to the point that
it interfered with following instructions or tasks they were
given. Participants completed the self-report questionnaires
and answered questions after the performance coherently and
reliably. Coherent answering can, for instance, be inferred from
the high correlation coefficients between the before- and after-
performance assessments and the replication of previous findings
such as those on repetition avoidance (Brugger et al., 1990) and
the correlations between non-traditional and traditional RPBs
scores (Aarnio and Lindeman, 2007; Mohr et al., 2015; Prike et al.,
2017).
Conclusion
In the search for causal mechanisms of adult belief formation, we
elaborated on an experimental design, with magic performance as
its central event. We exposed undergraduate students to a magic
performance in the classroom. We tested belief-related explicit
(RPB scores) and implicit (repetition avoidance) measures
before and after the performance and tested whether pre-
existing beliefs impacted how this performance was explained
in psychic, conjuring, and religious terms. We neither found
before–after effects nor framing effects. Yet, we observed that
the more a magic performance involved psychic routines, the
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more likely participants were to endorse psychic as well as
religious explanations. In particular, we observed an increase
in psychic explanations and a drop in conjuring explanations
when performances involved such psychic routines. Thus,
future studies should profit from a high probability of psychic
explanations after such magic performances, and consider
variables that lead to before–after effects as well as framing effects.
Some directions have been proposed such as the co-existence
of psychic and conjuring explanations in the same individual,
and the potentially affective (see e.g., Lesaffre et al., 2018) and
attention-capturing components of the magic performance.
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